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Making Waves: Leibniz’s Legacy and Impact 
 
The story of the legacy and impact of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) has as many 
twists and turns as there are people who have been touched by his ideas, each twist and turn 
forming a new story about the adoption, amplification, development, rejection, or distortion 
of Leibniz’s thought from his own time to ours. This volume contains eleven such stories. 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce them and put them in a broader context. 
 
Part 1: Early Impact 
As is well known, during his lifetime, Leibniz won his greatest fame in the republic of letters 
for his contributions to mathematics,1 especially for his development of the differential and 
integral calculus, which was acknowledged to be a landmark contribution to the field from 
the 1690s onwards, following its endorsement by a number of influential mathematicians (see 
Probst 2018).2 The invention also soured the final years of Leibniz’s life—and his reputation 
in Britain for many generations—following the 1712 verdict of the Royal Society that he had 
plagiarized the calculus from Isaac Newton (1643-1727). While the priority dispute, as it 
became known, has been the subject of many works (e.g. Hall 1980, Meli 1993), the early 
background to it has remained underexplored, at least till now.3 In the opening chapter of this 
volume, Philip Beeley turns back the clock to tell a captivating tale about Leibniz’s varied 
and more often than not volatile relationships with the members of the Royal Society in 
London. Drawing on new material, Beeley reveals some of Leibniz’s misjudgments and faux 
pas in his dealings with the Society that would contribute to shaping his reputation in Britain 
for decades to come. Through a careful interlacing of daily minutiae and fateful episodes, 
Beeley establishes an intricate web of factors that explains what gave rise to the suspicions of 
plagiarism against Leibniz. While the priority dispute was inevitably a huge personal setback 
for Leibniz and cast a long shadow over his reception in Britain for the remainder of the 
eighteenth century, on the European mainland he was able to rely on the faithful support of a 
group of influential mathematicians4 who defended him against the attacks of the Newtonians 
                                                 
1 As Fontenelle (1812, 137) wrote in his eulogy of Leibniz of 1717: “It would be pointless to say that Mr 
Leibniz was a mathematician of the first rank, [since] it is through mathematics that he is most generally 
known.” 
2 For the influence of Leibniz’s mathematics, see especially Krömer and Chin-Drian 2012. Amongst his 
contemporaries, Leibniz’s insights clearly inspired the works of the Bernoullis (Jakob and his younger brother 
Johann) and also Jakob’s nephew Daniel Bernoulli, himself a contemporary of one of the greatest 
mathematicians of the eighteenth century, Leonhard Euler. Basel born and bred, Euler would join the academies 
in Berlin and then Saint Petersburg to develop amongst other, the variational calculus which optimizes for 
functions, not for points. In France there are at least two significant figures, Émilie du Châtelet (1706-1749) and 
Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717-1783), a mathematician, mechanician and physicist who repeatedly referred to 
Leibniz in his Encyclopédie [Encyclopedia], with entries amongst others on Action (I, 119-20), Binary 
Arithmetic (I, 680), Final Causes (II, 789), the Law of Continuity (IV, 116-17), Cosmology (IV, 294-7), the 
Calculus (IV, 985-8 and 988-9), Conservation of Living Forces (VII, 114-16), Dynamics (V, 174-6), Living 
Force (VII, 112-14), Logarithm (IX, 630-3), Sufficient Reason (XV, 634-5). To jump ahead two hundred years, 
in our times Leibniz has inspired eminent figures such as Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and more recently Julian 
Barbour (1937-) , as well as Georg Cantor (1848-1918), L.E.J. Brouwer (1881-1966) and Hermann Weyl (1885-
1955), and also Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) who, according to anecdote, borrowed every available book on Leibniz 
from the Princeton library and never brought them back. Karl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855) picked up the linear 
algebra which Leibniz had started off with the concept of the “determinant”. In the 1970s, Benoît Mandelbrot 
(1924-2010) brought fractals back to life and credited Leibniz with anticipating many key concepts; even more 
recently, in an article in 2006 Gregory Chaitin (1947-) went as far as to suggest that Leibniz was the original 
source of algorithmic information theory. A big thanks to Erik Vynckier for his input and explanations. 
3 Though see Boas Hall 1978. 
4 Most visibly, in Switzerland under Johann and Daniel Bernoulli and in Germany under Christian Wolff. 
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and continued promoting his work, ensuring that his calculus and the use of differential 
equations entered into university curriculums. 
Yet while many of Leibniz’s innovations, especially in mathematics and philosophy, 
went on to influence those who followed, as we shall see, others did so only belatedly or in 
some cases not at all. For example, it has been noted that Leibniz was the first to produce a 
geological theory of the Earth’s formation in his Protogaea of 1691-1693 (Hedge 1884, 198; 
Poirier 2017, 223), though it would be almost a century before this would shape the thinking 
of other naturalists, most notably that of Georges Buffon (1707-1788).5 To take even more 
extreme examples, while Leibniz appears to have been the first to apply the newly-discovered 
water cycle to explain a flood event (see Strickland and Church 2015), this discovery did not 
influence the development of the nascent science of hydrology in any way; and while Leibniz 
was responsible for many innovations in logic, it has been argued that these did not influence 
later developments but rather just anticipated them (see Peckhaus 2012). In each of these 
cases, the reason Leibniz’s innovations had belated or even no influence was because the 
writings in which they are found were not published for a long time after his death, by which 
time the disciplines to which they contributed had moved on. Protogaea, for example, was 
not published until 1749 (see Leibniz 1749), many of Leibniz’s writings on logic not until 
1839 (with many more not following until the twentieth century), and his text on floods not 
until 2015! 
 There is little doubt that Leibniz’s posthumous influence was thus governed—and 
often considerably restricted—by the availability of his writings.6 Leibniz wrote incessantly 
but published relatively little during his lifetime: around two hundred journal articles on a 
variety of different topics, the Théodicée [Theodicy] (Leibniz 1710), and several volumes of 
historical documents. His unpublished writings, amounting to around half a million pages, 
did not appear immediately after his death but trickled out over the course of the following 
decades and centuries. A handful of collections of his writings were issued in the years after 
his death (e.g. Clarke 1717; Leibniz 1718); others appeared in the mid-eighteenth century 
(e.g. Leibniz 1765; Dutens), with many more appearing in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (e.g. GM, G, Klopp, A). Attempts to publish all of Leibniz’s surviving work is still 
ongoing, and not likely to be complete for another fifty years. Thus when considering the 
posthumous impact of Leibniz’s work it is important to bear in mind how little of it was 
available in the decades after his death. 
 Although the full extent of Leibniz’s written legacy has only gradually become 
apparent since his death, it is possible to ascertain the historical impact of those parts of it that 
were available to his contemporaries and the generations of thinkers that followed. If we were 
to summarize what has been written on his posthumous impact thus far (see for example 
Heinekamp 1986, Adams 2010, Krömer and Chin-Drian 2012), the story would probably go 
something like this: the strongest impression Leibniz’s ideas made on others was felt during 
his lifetime and in the years immediately following his death. This impression was felt less 
and less by successive generations, and accordingly Leibniz’s influence dwindled to the point 
where, as one scholar puts it, his ideas “did not find many advocates in the twentieth century” 
(Adams 2010, 309). But this is far from an adequate picture for a number of reasons. First, 
Leibniz’s influence arguably did not hit an early peak in the decades after his death and then 
                                                 
5 While claims of Leibniz’s influence on Buffon are common (see for example Wakefield 2018, 463), it should 
be noted that Buffon (1749, I: 196), while clearly an admirer of Leibniz’s ideas about the physical history of the 
Earth, also deemed them to be “devoid of proofs”; in Buffon’s view, since Leibniz had concerned himself with 
the remote past, of which few vestiges remain, there was no way to ascertain whether his account of the Earth’s 
formation was probable or not. 
6 One scholar has argued that Leibniz was “all the less influential” because so many of his ideas were way ahead 
of their time (Ross 1984, 114). 
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decline smoothly, but rather oscillated throughout the eighteenth century and beyond; indeed, 
the second half of the eighteenth century saw a “Leibniz Renaissance” in Germany, 
stimulated in part by the publication of his Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain [New 
Essays on Human Understanding] in 1765 and Dutens’ six-volume collection of his writings 
in 1768 (see Wundt 1992, 318-19), while something similar occurred in France in the 
nineteenth century following the publication in 1819 of Maine de Biran’s Exposition de la 
doctrine philosophique de Leibniz [Exposition of the Philosophical Doctrine of Leibniz] (see 
Dunham 2016). Second, the extent of Leibniz’s influence depends very much on the 
particular idea or doctrine under consideration, with some enjoying much greater longevity 
than others. And lastly, while it would be true to say that the direct take-up of his ideas and 
arguments by others was much less evident in the twentieth century than it was in previous 
centuries, it would be equally true to say that in the last century and in ours Leibniz’s ideas 
continued to serve as a source of inspiration, stimulating the development of new ideas and 
arguments in others, as will become clear in what follows. With this in mind, let us now 
return to Leibniz’s early impact. 
 It is a fact often repeated that, in spite of his prodigious productivity, Leibniz 
published only one philosophical book in his lifetime, namely Theodicy (1710), which sought 
a philosophical-theological justification of God’s ways to man. At the heart of the book is 
Leibniz’s doctrine of optimism, which holds that our world (or universe) is the best of all 
those possible. In chapter 2, Lloyd Strickland sets out to examine the early reception of 
Leibnizian optimism from the publication of the Theodicy in 1710 to the mid-1770s. 
Strickland’s starting point is the centuries-old belief that the devastating major earthquake 
which struck Lisbon on 1 November 1755 constituted the turning point in the fortunes of the 
doctrine and led to its ultimate demise. Against this, Strickland shows that the evidence 
points to a different fate, namely that while Leibniz’s doctrine did win a good number of 
adherents in the 1720s and 1730s, especially in Germany, support for it had largely dried up 
by the mid-1740s; moreover, while opponents of Leibniz’s doctrine were few and far 
between in the 1710s and 1720s, they became increasing vocal in the 1730s and afterwards, 
between them producing an array of objections that served to make Leibnizian optimism both 
philosophically and theologically toxic years before the Lisbon earthquake struck. 
 Although Leibnizian optimism never regained its popularity, it did at least win many 
converts in the first few decades of the eighteenth century and shaped the debate about 
optimism and the wider project of theodicy for centuries afterwards.7 In contrast, some of 
Leibniz’s endeavors did not yield much if any impact, either in his own lifetime or after. For 
example, his efforts to unite Catholics and Lutherans, and later Lutherans and Calvinists, 
were unsuccessful, as was his three-year effort to construct wind machines to drain the silver 
mines of the Harz mountains (see Jordan 1927 and Wakefield 2010). Moreover, his plans for 
a universal encyclopedia, which would contain everything that was so far known woven into 
                                                 
7 Theologians have often either marginalized, ignored or rejected Leibniz’s optimism, though this is less because 
of its perceived defects than because the problem of theodicy has itself changed over the years. As one scholar 
observes: “the fact that Leibniz’s Theodicy occupies only a precarious place in theological discourse is also due 
to the fact that a broad consensus has emerged that the theodicy problem cannot and should not be solved in the 
form of a consistent theory, that thinking about it, on the contrary, is only of preliminary importance, 
preliminary in view of the only truly satisfactory solution, the actual overcoming of suffering and evil” (Sparn 
2013, 442). But while Leibniz’s theodicy has struggled to gain traction among theologians, it continues to 
fascinate and exercise philosophers; in recent years, Leibniz scholar Nicholas Rescher (2000, 148-79) has 
developed a naturalistic or non-theistic version of optimism in the form of his axiological metaphysics, which 
holds that a law of optimality prevails which prevents the existence of every possible world bar the best. 
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a single system, barely got off the drawing board (see Rateau 2018).8 Rather more headway 
was made with Leibniz’s desideratum for a better understanding of inductive and probable 
logic, for which he enlisted the support of Jakob Bernoulli (1655-1705) in establishing a 
mathematics of probability. Leibniz’s conceptions of induction and the distinctions between 
demonstrative and probable logic certainly foreshadow David Hume’s (1711-1776) own 
arguments on truth modalities and associationism. But was this mere anticipation on 
Leibniz’s part or something more? In chapter 3, Julia Weckend suggests the latter. Her 
starting point is a short piece by Hume entitled Abstract of a Book Lately Published (1740) in 
which he portrays himself as responding to Leibniz’s call for a “new kind of logic” with a 
novel theory on causal or probable reasoning. She argues that, on close examination, there are 
discernible traces of Leibnizian elements in Hume’s arguments in the early Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739-40), in particular Leibnizian principles which inform Hume’s handling 
of truth modalities, in spite of the obvious disparity in philosophical temperament and overall 
background assumptions between Leibniz and Hume. 
 When examining Leibniz’s early impact it is tempting to focus only on those who 
explicitly adopted some of his ideas or developed parts of his intellectual program, but to do 
so would be to tell an incomplete story. After all, Leibniz so dominated the intellectual 
landscape of the eighteenth century that those not prepared to endorse his ideas felt obliged to 
respond to them and to position themselves relative to them. We might term this Leibniz’s 
“negative influence”, so to speak, where his ideas inspired others to craft responses, either in 
the form of objections or, more commonly, in the form of new ideas and philosophies. It was 
in response to Leibniz’s philosophy that André Pierre Le-Guay de Prémontval (1716-1764) 
was stirred into developing a process philosophy avant la lettre (see Strickland 2018) and 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) his critical philosophy, at least to some extent (see Jauernig 
2011). It has been claimed that, in fashioning his critical philosophy, Kant came to reject 
virtually all of Leibniz’s principles and doctrines (see Wilson 2018), and certainly Kant’s 
handling of Leibniz was deemed to be so hostile to Leibniz’s thought that it prompted spirited 
responses from Leibniz’s supporters such as Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809), who 
insisted that whatever is true in Kant’s philosophy had already been said by Leibniz, and on 
those points on which Kant did differ he was simply wrong (see Allison 1973). What 
certainly stands out is Kant’s ubiquitous references to Leibniz—in both Kant’s precritical and 
critical period there are by far more explicit references to Leibniz than to any other early 
modern philosopher. Whether Kant, as the traditional view would have it, had genuinely 
abandoned Leibnizianism by the time of the Critik der Reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure 
Reason] (1781) is unclear. What is known for sure is that Eberhard’s attack deeply upset 
Kant. In a short polemical piece, On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason 
is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One (1790), Kant set out to defend himself against 
Eberhard’s attack by claiming that his first Critique could in fact be read as “the true apology 
for Leibniz,” thereby insinuating that Kant himself, rather than Eberhard and the Wolffians, 
was the true philosophical heir to Leibniz. In chapter 4, Nicholas Jolley takes Kant up on his 
suggestion and addresses two puzzles of interpretation posed by Kant’s reply to Eberhard, 
namely whether Kant takes Leibniz to be an idealist, and why Kant fails to cite his agreement 
with Leibniz that space and time are ideal. 
 
Part 2: Legacy in Science and Metaphysics 
Kant’s reaction to Leibniz would ensure that Leibniz’s reception at the end of the eighteenth 
century differed considerably from that at the beginning. After his death in 1716, Leibniz was 
                                                 
8 The fate of projects such as these have given rise to the common portrayal of Leibniz as a man with the 
greatest of ambitions but who spread himself too thinly, leaving behind him a series of projects either conceived 
but never really started or started but left unfinished. 
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widely praised for his universal genius and his contributions to many disciplines. In a eulogy 
delivered in 1717, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle noted some of the disciplines to which 
Leibniz had made original contributions, including politics, history, law, mathematics, 
philosophy, and many areas of science, including what we would now call physics, biology, 
and chemistry (see Fontenelle 1812). Fontenelle also noted that Leibniz helped advance the 
sciences indirectly, through his lobbying for the establishment of scientific academies. 
Indeed, in 1700 Leibniz succeeded in persuading Frederick III (1657-1713) to establish a 
scientific academy in Berlin, the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, an institution that 
survived until German reunification in 1991, after which it was reconstituted as the Berlin-
Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. In 1712 Leibniz also sought to establish 
an Imperial Society of Sciences in Vienna, though the institution existed in name only during 
his lifetime, being finally established only long after his death, in 1847 (see Rudolph 2018). 
 As for Leibniz’s own contributions to the sciences, one of the most notable resulted in 
the so-called “vis viva” controversy, which had started with Leibniz’s attack on the Cartesian 
measure of “force”.9 The dispute itself turned on the question of whether the quantity 
conserved in the collision of bodies is the Cartesian “quantity of motion” (momentum, mv) or 
the Leibnizian “living force” (mv2). This question is no longer considered in classical physics, 
having been superseded by the subsequent work of physicists like Émilie du Châtelet (1706-
1749), Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), Pierre Louis Maupertuis (1698-1759), Joseph-Louis 
Lagrange (1736-1813), and Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827), who between them 
successfully established classical mechanical physics. To illustrate this, in chapter 5 Tzuchien 
Tho examines Leibniz’s contribution to the physics of body of the early eighteenth century 
and the true extent of Leibniz’s influence on classical mechanics. At the core of his analysis 
is the role Leibniz’s dynamics may have played in informing the Traité de dynamique 
[Treatise on Dynamics] of Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (1717-1783). Tho’s verdict is mixed. 
Although d’Alembert used Leibnizian terms (e.g. “dynamics”) in his discussions, he also 
clearly did not adopt any of the metaphysical and theological trappings that Leibniz attached 
to them, on the grounds that these were obscure and useless to mechanics. D’Alembert thus 
shared few, if any, of the same background assumptions as Leibniz, particularly those 
concerning the meaning and importance of the conservation of a “living force”, and as such 
his general aims of physics were fundamentally different from those of Leibniz. Thus 
Leibniz’s influence on d’Alembert is better understood as one of the transmission of a 
problem in need of a solution rather than a positive doctrine or method of calculation. 
According to Tho, what Leibniz lacked was an analysis of how the universal conservation of 
living forces was to be achieved by the motion of bodies. This left behind a robust question 
d’Alembert was able to answer. Whilst Leibniz’s impact on d’Alembert was less pronounced 
than perhaps expected, Tho also suggests that the intellectual lineage that originated in 
Leibniz is in fact more evident in d’Alembert’s successor, Lagrange. 
 If Leibniz succeeded in leaving his mark on a number of fledgling sciences, all the 
more was his influence felt on the philosophical landscape. Leibniz had of course attempted 
to shape a number of philosophical debates in his own day through a series of journal articles, 
such as “Meditation on truth, knowledge, and ideas” (1684, A VI 4, 585-92/L 291-6), “New 
system of the nature and communication of substances” (1695, G IV, 477-87/SLT 68-77), 
and “On nature itself” (1698, G IV, 504-16/L 498-508), as well as through the Theodicy. 
Many more philosophical pieces appeared posthumously, which made possible a more 
rounded picture of Leibniz’s philosophy than was attainable from the pieces he had published 
in his lifetime. The richness and originality of Leibniz’s philosophy ensured he attracted his 
                                                 
9 For Leibniz’s part in overturning Cartesian physics, achieved through a series of anti-Cartesian articles placed 
in various journals from the 1680s onwards, in 1715 the Dutch thinker Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738) 
described him as “the ornament of Germany” (Boerhaave 1983, 160). 
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fair share of followers in the eighteenth century, and in the decades after his death it was not 
uncommon for these to be referred to as “Leibnizians”. But just as there was no single set of 
doctrines to which all followers of René Descartes (1596-1650) subscribed, and certainly no 
single movement called Cartesianism (see Schmaltz 2004, 9-12), there was no set of 
doctrines to which all of Leibniz’s followers subscribed either, let alone a movement that 
could be correctly described as Leibnizianism. Those who were called Leibnizians were not 
true disciples; indeed, true disciples prepared to adopt and defend most or all of the master’s 
ideas are rare for any thinker, and Leibniz is no exception. Even in the decades after his death 
in 1716, most of those who felt his influence were selective in the ideas they endorsed and 
typically sought to refine his ideas and principles rather than embrace them unchanged, 
though the extent to which supporters made their modifications varied considerably. 
 Undoubtedly the most well-known partisan of Leibniz’s philosophy was Christian 
Wolff (1679-1754), though the extent of Wolff’s debt to Leibniz was a matter of some debate 
in the eighteenth century. One of Wolff’s opponents, Johann Joachim Lange (1670-1744), 
claimed that Wolff had borrowed his views on God, the world, and the soul from Leibniz and 
had merely “put the Leibnizian philosophy ... into the form of a specific system” (Lange 
1723, preface, n.p.). The suggestion that Wolff had done little more than systematize Leibniz 
was captured in the expression “Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy”, which was freely used by 
both Wolff’s supporters and detractors alike, with a flurry of books on the “Leibnizian-
Wolffian” philosophy appearing in the 1720s and 1730s. Wolff was quick to deny that he was 
merely a systematizer of Leibniz, stating “It is not true at all that I have put the Leibnizian 
philosophy into the form of a specific system, since my metaphysical meditations contain 
only a few things from Leibniz” (Wolff 1724, 34).10 But Wolff’s efforts to downplay his debt 
to Leibniz did not prevent it from becoming widely believed that his was a modified form of 
Leibniz’s philosophy. And indeed, for good reason, for as has been noted (see Ecole 1986), 
Wolff borrowed numerous definitions, principles, and doctrines from Leibniz, often without 
acknowledging his debt, such that Wolff’s philosophy draws from and depends upon 
Leibniz’s philosophy as much as it diverges from it. 
 Leibniz’s philosophical thought—often in modified form and sometimes through the 
mediation of Wolff—was also defended by a number of other eighteenth century thinkers, 
such as Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693-1750), du Châtelet, and most notably Alexander 
Baumgarten (1714-1762), whose oft-reprinted Metaphysica [Metaphysics] was more closely 
aligned to Leibniz than to Wolff (see Baumgarten 2011). In the first few decades after 
Leibniz’s death some thinkers even attempted apologies for entire texts, with Michael 
Gottlieb Hansch (1683-1749) publishing a lengthy defense of Leibniz’s “Monadology” (see 
Hansch 1728) and Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) doing likewise with Leibniz’s Theodicy (see 
de Vattel 1742). But this was the exception rather than the rule, with most training their 
attention upon specific doctrines or themes in Leibniz’s thought rather than on entire texts. 
 While Leibniz’s philosophy had its greatest impact in Europe, it is a testimony to its 
power that its effect has also been felt outside that continent, for example in the United States 
(see Rescher 2013, 300-12) and in Russia. In chapter 6, Frédéric Tremblay explores the full 
extent of Russian Leibnizianism, documenting the relevance of Leibniz’s philosophy and 
intellectual lineage starting with his direct impact on Peter the Great (1672-1725) and the 
establishment of the academy in Saint Petersburg all the way through to modern day Russia. 
                                                 
10 Wolff was not the only one to resist claims of Leibnizian influence. Another to do so was Maupertuis, who 
sought to show that his principle of least action, a mathematized version of the metaphysical dictum that nature 
always acts in the simplest possible ways, differed from Leibniz’s principle that light always travels by the 
easiest path (see Maupertuis 2018, 243; for Leibniz’s principle, see Leibniz 1682). This did not satisfy Leibniz’s 
sympathizers, however, who suggested that Maupertuis’ principle was not as original as he believed, a claim 
that Maupertuis forcefully resisted (see Terrall 2002, 289; Lamborn 2016). 
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Tremblay shows that Russian Leibnizianism was considerably rejuvenated when the 
Leibnizian German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller (1832-1888) took up a position at the 
University of Dorpat in 1871. This gave rise to one of two influential strands of 
Leibnizianism led by Russian philosophers like Evgeny Bobrov (1867-1933) and Alexei 
Alexandrovich Kozlov (1831-1901), as well as Kozlov’s son, Serge Alekseyevich Askoldov 
(1870-1945) together with his friend Nikolai Lossky (1870-1965). In a second development, 
Moscow became the conduit of a seemingly independent strand of Leibnizianism presumably 
under the partial influence of Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900). Through their efforts, Russian 
Leibnizianism flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and has left 
traces that remain today. 
 That Leibniz should have won great international appeal is all the more fitting given 
his own cosmopolitanism, best exemplified in his engagement with China and its philosophy. 
It has been noted that Leibniz was “the first important thinker in the West ... to start a 
constructive dialogue between Neo-Confucianism and Western Philosophy” (Meynard 2017, 
194), and in the first half of the eighteenth century, Leibniz’s admiration of the moral 
philosophy of the Chinese helped to shape the thorny debate about whether pagans could be 
virtuous (see [Collins] 1727, 59-60; Tindal 1730, 404; Smith 1740, 114-15). Indeed, his 
positive attitude towards the Chinese proved quite influential for a number of decades after 
his death, serving to epitomize and deepen the Sinophilia that was common in the early 
enlightenment; it also stands in sharp contrast to the racially-motivated dismissal of Chinese 
philosophy that one finds in the writings of Kant and Hegel (see Fuchs 2006, Park 2013, and 
Perkins 2016). 
 In engaging with Chinese philosophy, Leibniz famously tried to show that many of 
his own ideas had been pre-empted by the Chinese. This resulted in an erroneous claim about 
his influence, for which Leibniz was partly responsible. In 1701, one of his correspondents, 
the Jesuit missionary Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730), suggested—erroneously as it happens—
that Leibniz’s discovery of binary arithmetic was the key to understanding the mysterious 
hexagrams of the Chinese I-Ching (see A I 20, 533-55).11 The idea excited Leibniz 
sufficiently to go public with his discovery, which he claimed—following Bouvet—was the 
key to deciphering the hexagrams. Compounding the error, Leibniz concluded that he had not 
so much discovered binary arithmetic as rediscovered it (GM VII, 226). This induced many 
eighteenth century writers to present Leibniz as the decipherer of the I-Ching (e.g. Bilfinger 
1724, 358-60; Croker, Williams, and Clark 1766, n.p.), the error becoming corrected only in 
the century’s closing years (see for example Oznam 1790, 4-5).12 
 While Leibniz’s invention of binary arithmetic would have little influence for 
centuries after his death (see Glaser 1981), many of his core philosophical doctrines had a 
considerable impact on the eighteenth century and beyond. From the eighteenth century 
onwards, Leibniz’s most famous philosophical doctrines have been the pre-established 
harmony, optimism, “petites perceptions”, and monadology. Of these, the pre-established 
harmony arguably had the smallest impact. It certainly found a number of supporters in the 
                                                 
11 An English translation of Bouvet’s letter (dated 4 November 1701) can be found here: https://leibniz-
bouvet.swarthmore.edu/  
12 Surely most egregious example of a false claim about Leibniz’s influence – this time not caused by Leibniz 
himself – occurred early in the nineteenth century following the discovery of his so-called Consilium 
Aegyptiacum [Egyptian plan]. Written in 1671-2, this was a proposal for a French invasion of Egypt that was 
intended for Louis XIV, though the French king never did see it and opted to invade Holland instead (in what 
became the Franco-Dutch war of 1672-8). The discovery of Leibniz’s proposal was made only a few years after 
Napoleon had invaded Egypt in 1798, leading a number of writers to suppose that Napoleon must have come 
across a copy of Leibniz’s Egyptian Plan at Versailles and then followed it in his conquest of Egypt (see for 
example [Anon.] 1803, viii, and Michaud 1822, V: 156). As it happened, Napoleon did come to know of 
Leibniz’s plan, but only upon its publication in 1803, five years after he’d invaded Egypt. 
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decades after Leibniz’s death, such as Bilfinger, and even Wolff considered it the best or 
most probable solution to the problem of how mind and body form a unity, a view also taken 
by some of his followers, such as Ludwig Philipp Thümmig (1697-1728) (see Watkins 1998). 
However, in the face of fierce opposition, support for the doctrine tapered off dramatically in 
the second half of the eighteenth century; since then, it has typically been treated as little 
more than an idea that is as ingenious as it is implausible (see for example Bonnet 1783, 
XVIII: 104; Brown 1813, I: 396-8; Stewart 1854, I: 55-258). 
 Of more enduring—if much less immediate—impact was Leibniz’s doctrine of 
“petites perceptions” [little perceptions], that is, perceptions of which we are not conscious, 
and the associated idea of a threshold (limen). It has often been claimed that Leibniz was the 
first to discover unconscious perceptions (see e.g. Hartmann 2014, 17), or more correctly, the 
first to offer a systematic treatment of them (Manson 2000, 153; Tallis 2002, 1),13 but his 
ideas were largely neglected in the eighteenth century, partly because their most detailed 
treatment is to be found in the New Essays on Human Understanding, which was not 
published until 1765. In the 1820s, however, Leibniz’s ideas were developed by Johann 
Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), and through him helped to shape later thinking about 
unconsciousness and psychoanalysis (see Claxton 2005, 214-15). More recently, Leibniz’s 
ideas about little perceptions—and the broader framework in which they appear—have 
formed the basis of a study on the phenomenological and neurophysiological aspects of 
consciousness and time (see Sieroka 2015). 
 Arguably the most influential of Leibniz’s philosophical doctrines was his 
monadology, which holds that the universe consists of a plurality of self-determining simple 
beings. The idea has often been misunderstood, most notably by Leonhard Euler, who 
construed Leibniz’s monads as physical atoms (see Euler 1746, 17-20, and 1833, II: 39-64, 
especially 45), a rather egregious error that overshadowed the discussion of monads in the 
eighteenth century but ultimately did not prevent the doctrine from gaining a great many 
supporters both at the time and long after. Indeed, in terms of influence, few of Leibniz’s 
contributions can match the longevity of the monadology, which had numerous advocates 
prepared to receive, recast, and rehabilitate it well into the twentieth century (see Poser 
1986). In chapter 7, Jeremy Dunham demonstrates the lengths to which supporters of a 
monadology would go to defend the doctrine. As Dunham explains, in the aftermath of the 
Darwinian revolution in biology the most crucial challenge concerning monadology was to 
maintain any framework in which species were understood as “fixed”. And yet, against all 
odds, at the end of the nineteenth century monadological theories were not forever abandoned 
in the wake of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Instead, as the British idealist F.H. Bradley 
(1846-1924) prophesized, monadologies increased and flourished again at the turn of the 
twentieth century when two early twentieth-century philosophers—the American idealist 
George Holmes Howison (1834-1916) and the British idealist James Ward (1843-1925)—
both attempted to adapt Leibniz’s monadology to make it compatible with Darwin’s findings. 
 Also notable is that Leibniz’s doctrine of the monad has enjoyed great international 
support, with versions of it put forward not just by German and French thinkers, such as 
Herbart, Dietrich Mahnke (1884-1939), Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) and Louis Prat 
                                                 
13 Leibniz was certainly not the first to claim that we have perceptions of which we are unaware, as in 1672 
Ignace Gaston Pardies (1636-1673), an acquaintance of Leibniz’s during his time in Paris, stated that 
“...sometimes we also have perceptions ... where we perceive without being aware that we are perceiving... To 
become fully convinced of this, we have only to reflect on what happens to us every day when we are reading a 
book with some application. We are attentive to the meaning of the words and do not attend to a consideration 
of the letters which, by their different shapes and arrangement, make up the whole discourse... In this case we 
must recognize that we do not perceive the letters and words of this book with that reflexive perception by 
which we can give an account to ourselves of what we are perceiving, and which would make us aware that we 
are perceiving” (Pardies 1672, 154, 159-60). 
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(1861-1942), but also British thinkers such as Herbert Wildon Carr (1857-1931) and Alfred 
North Whitehead (1861-1947), and Russian thinkers such as (the already mentioned) Alexei 
Alexandrovich Kozlov (1831–1901) and Lev Mikhailovich Lopatin (1855-1920) (see 
Renouvier and Prat 1899, Carr 1922, Carr 1926, Lossky 1952, 158-61, Basile 2019, Beiser 
2015, Poser 2017). The monadology was also that rare thing, a philosophical doctrine that 
was able to cross disciplinary boundaries, with versions being developed in disciplines such 
as sociology and anthropology, to which Arnaud Pelletier’s contribution in chapter 8 is 
dedicated. Pelletier’s focus is not the monadological thesis as such but rather the idea of 
recognizing individuality for its points of view in the network of relation that makes up the 
overall whole. The monad’s particularity in this case is expressed in the thesis of 
individuation through bodies, which in different ways attracted the attention of social 
anthropologists Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) at the end of 
the nineteenth century. These authors, together with Émile Boutroux (1845-1921), have 
played a decisive role in the emergence of Leibnizian thought in the social sciences. How 
much their two independent stances clashed in the discussion about the definition of the 
emerging social sciences is well documented, and also that their discrepancies gave rise to 
two turns amongst French sociologists: Tarde’s claimed neo-monadology (positing 
multiplicities without convergence) and Durkheim’s otherwise monadological sociology 
(positing convergent particularities). 
 
 
Part 3: Impact in Law, Political Thought and Ecology 
By profession, of course, Leibniz was neither a philosopher nor a scientist (avant la lettre); 
from 1676 he was employed as a court counselor in the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg and 
twenty years later was promoted to privy counselor of justice. His chief responsibilities were 
for the ducal library in Hanover and, from 1686, for writing the history of the Welf/Guelph 
family that had ruled the duchy and associated territories for many centuries. In addition, in 
1700 Leibniz was appointed privy counselor of justice in Brandenburg, serving the court at 
Berlin, and in 1713 imperial court counselor in Vienna. Despite Leibniz’s success in 
multiplying courtly appointments, it has been noted that his influence at the courts of 
Hanover, Berlin, and Vienna was limited; according to Nicholas Rescher, Leibniz “was and 
ever remained regarded as a resident technical expert, a source of information and informed 
opinion—an instructive and agreeable interlocutor. To put it in present-day jargon Leibniz 
had access but not clout” (Rescher 2013, 280). Despite this, two of Leibniz’s most notable 
achievements in his lifetime were in the field of politics: his historical work on the 
Welf/Guelph family helped elevate the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg to the status of an 
Electorate of the Holy Roman Empire, while his publication of legal documents helped 
support the case for the Hanoverian succession to the British throne (see Antognazza 2018, 
591). 
 The posthumous impact of Leibniz’s legal work is less clear cut, however, and 
remains a matter of scholarly debate. In recent years it has been argued that, through his 
attempts to codify the law, “Leibniz is the force behind the German field of legal science and 
the related drive toward legal codifications that swept through Europe (and much of Asia and 
Latin America) throughout the nineteenth century” (Berkowitz 2005, 69), a claim for which 
others have suggested the evidence is lacking (see Seidler 2006, 94). 
 Particularly in his very early years Leibniz’s productive output of serious juridical 
writings is astonishing, and throughout his life his involvement in matters of law—theoretical 
and practical—never diminished. On the practical side, Leibniz was employed by the elector 
and prince-archbishop of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, to assist in the drafting of 
legal reform and then in 1669 was made assessor in the Court of Appeal (see Mackie 1845, 
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44-5). He would later serve in some of the highest offices as a diplomat and legal advisor to 
the likes of Czar Peter the Great (1672-1725) and the Prussian King in Berlin, where he 
became involved in the geopolitical and legal wrangling amongst the rulers of Europe and 
Russia, advising on issues such as the legitimacy and rightness of law. On the theoretical or 
law-defining side, his vision of an a priori science of the law he believed could only be 
accomplished by acknowledging the deeper reasons of justice, which he identified as the 
“charity of the wise” that would provide the right reasons for actions and ground law in the 
all-pervasive. In chapter 9, Christopher Johns traces the impact of two of Leibniz’s ground-
breaking legal tracts, namely Nova methodus dicendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae [A New 
Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence] (A VI 1, 259-364), an astonishing early 
achievement by the young Leibniz which introduces his paradigm geometrical method to the 
law, and Codex juris Gentium Diplomaticus [Diplomatic Code of People’s Rights] from 1693 
(A IV 5, 48-79), which is widely considered to be the culmination of Leibniz’s efforts of 
codifying the law. Johns argues that, broadly considered, the method of a “geometric” 
systematization and codification of the law would become very influential upon the 
development of the eighteenth-century law codes in France and Germany, and is strongly 
reflected in the natural law of Christian Wolff and in Anglo-American jurisprudence in the 
nineteenth century. Inadvertently, however, Leibniz’s geometric attack on the voluntarism of 
the likes of Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) and Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) has at the 
same time adverse effects on the vision of law that Leibniz had promoted, and it equally 
encourages a rejection of Leibnizian-Wolffian perfectionism in favor of a Kantian ethics of 
duty. According to Johns, Leibniz’s transcendent ideal of justice and his conception of justice 
as a virtue would be gradually replaced with an empirical-utilitarian, secularized, practice of 
the law. Such developments constitute the loss of overarching considerations like those 
towards a common good and a common end, losses, Johns suggests, significant enough for us 
to seriously reconsider.  
 In chapter 10, Douglas Moggach continues the theme by examining the consequences 
of Leibniz’s legal theories on the understanding of the political subject, and Leibniz’s 
foundational role for the enlightened absolutism of Christian Wolff, aesthetic concepts of 
freedom and subjectivity in Romanticism, and Kantian critiques of Leibnizian ideas of 
spontaneity and perfection. Moggach’s central focus is the reception history of the three 
principles of natural law (freedom, justice and progress) and their contents as Leibniz had 
endowed them. If we want to understand and defend the program of rational autonomy which 
is definitive of German Idealism, Moggach suggests, we need to look at its Leibnizian roots, 
even though the results of such an examination will show an admixture of continuities and 
transformations. In Christian Wolff we discover an attempt to remedy the conflicts he sees 
created in combining the law of spontaneous freedom with the requirement for external 
direction towards a goal of perfection. In Romanticism, on the other hand, we find the very 
same ideas giving birth to the concept of aesthetic subjectivity and the idea of the subject as 
formative power. In a separate important strand of development, Kant sets out to reclaim 
some of Leibniz’s most vital elements while according them a new systematic context and 
meaning. Any of these movements are evidence that Leibniz’s three principles, once 
reconfigured and rethought, remain definitive principles in German Idealism through Kant to 
Hegel and the Hegelian School.   
 The idea of autonomous spontaneity and the subject as a self-determining self-
sustaining being also made its way into the natural world where Leibniz’s vision left deep 
traces on biologists and environmentally-minded thinkers. It was a clear inspiration for some 
of the more speculative hypotheses of the naturalist Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), in 
particular his claim that in the beginning God created the preformed germs of all living things 
which then developed under their own power, advancing ever closer to perfection (see 
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Rieppel 1988, Duchesneau 2013). In more recent years, Leibniz’s vision of the biological 
world has been developed by Pauline Phemister (2016), who has argued for its relevance to 
modern-day environmental concerns. Although these concerns were not Leibniz’s, Phemister 
argues that certain elements of Leibniz’s thinking can nevertheless be seen as constituting an 
attractive vision of the natural world along with a set of values to govern our relationship 
with it. A central element of Leibnizian thought is his never-ceasing efforts towards reform 
which involves two closely related and interdependent levels, the theoretical and the 
practical, the abstract and the applied, or, theoria cum praxi. In chapter 11, Pauline Phemister 
closes the volume by developing this view. In the contemporary context, Phemister argues, 
we discover how Leibniz’s approach resonates today, albeit implicitly, in the methods and 
aspirations of Denise Herzing’s Wild Dolphin Project, where the Leibnizian goal of mutual 
understanding and respect among humans is being extended beyond the human, helping to 
foster harmonious relationships between humans and other creatures in nature and 
encouraging the development of sound environmental policies for their protection. As 
Phemister suggests, through his theories of self-sufficient agency and the interconnectedness 
of all things, Leibniz developed—albeit unknowingly—a template that provides a fruitful 
source for a modern-day ecological philosophy that will enable us to rethink our relationship 
with the natural world. That Leibniz’s ideas should still be relevant more than three hundred 
years after his death, in a matter of great public concern, surely speaks volumes about their 
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